Immigration Policy and Economic Growth by Muller, Thomas
Immigration Policy and Economic Growth
Thomas Muller*
The impact of immigration on economic welfare and social stabil-
ity has been the subject of controversy in the English-speaking
world since the sixteenth century. Tudor monarchs, colonial gover-
nors, and American presidents have generally supported liberal en-
try laws on the premise that they spur economic development. This
is understandable, as a large and growing economy confers political
benefits on its national leaders, both domestically and in foreign af-
fairs. The British Parliament and the American Congress, however,
reflecting the mood of a populace typically more concerned with so-
cial stability than with aggregate economic growth, have frequently
taken a less sanguine view of aliens.
In the United States, social concerns-religious, racial, and eth-
nic-create strong political pressure to curtail entry by aliens. Yet,
in what is viewed in this Article as the first phase of American immi-
gration policy, the migration from European nations, immigration
was essentially unrestricted.' For nearly a century and a half, eco-
nomic self-interest overcame political opposition to open entry.2
The passage of the Act of May 19, 1921 (the 1921 Immigration
Act) heralded the beginning of the second phase of United States
immigration policy. 3 Since its enactment, the nation has attempted
to limit entry by immigrants without fully assessing either the long-
term economic consequences of lower aggregate immigration or the
criteria used for admissions. Since limitations first were imposed,
only a fraction of all immigrants admitted have been selected be-
cause they possess skills that would benefit the nation. Although the
* Thomas Muller is the author of numerous publications on economic issues and is
presently completing a book on immigration policy for the Twentieth Century Fund. He
is a part-time faculty member in economics at George Mason University. B.S., Penn-
sylvania State University; Ph.D., American University.
1. This policy of open entry did not extend to non-European groups. Both skilled
and unskilled Chinese workers were shut out because "Chinese laborers in the country
endanger the good order of certain localities." Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58.
Most other Asians (except the Japanese) were excluded by Act of Feb. 5, 1917, Pub. L.
No. 301, 39 Stat. 874.
2. Optimism that the nation could absorb large numbers of immigrants and the vi-
sion of the United States as a place of refuge for the oppressed of other lands also
facilitated generous entry policies prior to World War I, although these factors appear
to have been secondary to economic incentives.
3. Act of May 19, 1921, Pub. L. No. 5, 42 Stat. 5.
101
Yale Law & Policy Review
economy has gained from the presence of immigrants who join fam-
ily members already residing in this country, these benefits are coin-
cidental to family reunification, the principal objective of
immigration policy over the last six decades.
This Article discusses the economic effects of several key immi-
gration laws and concludes that, fortuitously, the immigrants admit-
ted have contributed to the nation's economic development. The
positive contributions include higher rates of national economic
growth, a rise in per capita income, and strengthened urban core
economies. However, had the nation pursued more generous entry
policies since the 1920s additional advantages would have accrued,
particularly to inner cities.
The positive experience of recent immigration, the changing do-
mestic demographic patterns, and the urgent need to improve the
quality of the nation's labor force suggest that immigration laws
should be revised. The concluding section of this Article discusses
the need to link admissions criteria more closely with domestic labor
needs. The proposed approach is a modified version of the immi-
gration statute that passed the United States Senate in 1988.
The premise for the recommended revisions is that the nation has
entered a period of labor shortages which, in the absence of selec-
tive changes in the labor pool, threaten to slow economic growth.
In particular, current and projected deficiencies in the scientific and
engineering professions could harm the national drive to become
more competitive in the world market. Increased immigration is
one way to meet the short- and long-term needs of American indus-
try and institutions and to reduce inflationary pressures that result
from labor shortages.
L The Era of Unrestricted Immigration
Immigration to this land was initially encouraged by the British
Crown during the colonial period to populate a nearly empty conti-
nent. Britain attempted to restrict entry only in the latter part of
the eighteenth century, when-in part as result of their liberal immi-
gration policies-the colonies exercised their growing economic
strength to seek political objectives.
4
When the Republic was formed, states generally followed citizen-
ship policies that encouraged immigration. However, political and
4. For the early British and colonial view of citizenship, seeJ. H. Kettner, The Devel-
opment of American Citizenship, 1608-1870, at 13-127 (1978).
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social concerns associated with a rapid inflow of people from other
nations were expressed even by advocates of unrestricted immigra-
tion, including George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. 5 Anti-
immigrant sentiment among the populace erupted first against
Germans, followed by movements to restrict, in turn, Irish
Catholics, Chinese, Japanese, and, finally, eastern as well as south-
ern Europeans. But groups opposing alien entry lacked the political
power to substantially limit European immigrants, until the 1920s,
and entrants from the western hemisphere, until decades later. Eco-
nomic benefits accruing to industry from a continuing flow of for-
eign-born workers overcame substantial but episodic popular
opposition to their entry. President Cleveland vetoed legislation to
exclude illiterate entrants on the premise that such workers none-
theless contributed to national growth. 6 President Wilson vetoed
similar legislation in 1915, and Congress did not succeed in over-
coming presidential opposition on this issue until 1917. 7 In fact,
most occupants of the White House who expressed views on immi-
gration policy endorsed the liberal-entry posture of the business
community.
Influential landowners, industrialists, and merchants associated
open immigration with increased sales and profits. Business recog-
nized that an expanding population stimulated consumption and
caused property values to rise. Furthermore, aliens represented a
major source of young workers for expanding factories. Complaints
by organized labor that immigrants were competing unfairly, under-
cutting wages, and lowering the standard of living for their mem-
bers failed to arouse political support. Labor also blamed aliens for
the cyclical economic downturns plaguing the nation, a phenome-
non unrelated to immigration policies. To the contrary, an open-
borders immigration policy helped to relieve domestic unemploy-
ment. When jobs were scarce, fewer immigrants entered the United
States, while some recent immigrants returned to their native lands.
5. For the views of Washington and Jefferson on immigration, see 27 The Writings
of George Washington 253-54 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1938); Letter to Thomas Jefferson (Jan.
1, 1788), reprinted in 29 The Writings of George Washington 348-51 (. Fitzpatrick ed.
1939). See also Notes on the State of Virginia 1787, The Portable Thomas Jefferson 124
(M. Peterson ed. 1980).
6. President's Message to Congress on House Bill No. 7864, 9 Messages and Papers
of the President 757 (Mar. 2, 1897).
7. President Wilson refused to sign H.R. 6060, an act to regulate the immigration of
aliens to and the residence of aliens in the United States. President's Veto Message to
House of Representatives on H.R. 6060, 18 Messages and Papers of the President 8,423
(Jan. 28, 1915). In 1917, President Wilson's veto was overridden and literacy require-
ments enacted. See Act of Feb. 5, 1917, Pub. L. No. 301, 39 Stat. 874.
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The positive relationship between domestic demand for workers
and immigration levels had already been established by the 1920s.8
During the 1920s, the business community continued to endorse
a pro-immigration policy and opposed measures to severely con-
strain entry from eastern and southern Europe.9 But as the country
grew increasingly intolerant of ethnic minorities after World War I,
business could no longer prevent the passage of legislation limiting
entry from "undesirable" nations. Nonetheless, during most of its
existence, the United States pursued immigration policies that were
in its economic self-interest.
The effects of unrestricted immigration on the American economy
are illustrated by its population size and productive capacity in com-
parison to that of other nations. If the nation's founders had essen-
tially sealed the border when the Republic was established, the
population would be perhaps two-fifths its current size--less than
that of Japan and only one-third the size of the European Economic
Community.' 0 In the 1820s, prior to the first wave of mass immigra-
tion, the United States accounted for only a small share of the
world's economy. In that first period of mass immigration, which
began in the 1830s, the influx of Irish, German, and English workers
provided the unskilled and skilled labor force necessary to quickly
establish a manufacturing economy in urban areas." The massive
influx of eastern and southern Europeans half a century later al-
lowed industry to expand at a rapid rate and the United States to
become the world's leading industrial power by the end of the nine-
teenth century. During the late 1920s, when immigration limits be-
came fully effective, 43% of global economic output originated in
the United States.' 2 The pace of economic growth was attributable
to several factors, including an abundance of natural resources, a
stable political system, and the rapid absorption of technological
innovations. However, in the absence of a sizable and motivated
8. See H. Jerome, Migration and Business Cycles 239-240 (1926).
9. Restriction of Immigration: Hearings on H.R. 5, H.R. 101, and H.R. 561 Before
the House Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 193 (1924)
(statement ofJ. Friedel).
10. One estimate is that by 1920, 50% of all United States residents born since the
American Revolution were immigrants or descendants of immigrants. See S. Kuznets,
Growth, Population and Income Distribution 3 (1979). Since 1920, gross immigration
to the United States has totalled about 20 million. Therefore, the estimate that the na-
tion owes three-fifths of its population to immigration appears to be reasonable.
11. D. North, The Economic Growth of the United States, 17 90-1 8 6 0,,at 210-11
(1961).





immigrant labor force, the economy could not have expanded at the
rate achieved between 1830 and 1930.
One estimate is that the immigrant contribution to national eco-
nomic growth during each of the four decades between 1870 and
1910 ranged from 16% to 22%. 13 In addition to expanding the
economy, immigrants raised the per capita income of native resi-
dents. Three factors account for the higher standard of living than
would have been achieved in the absence of alien workers. First, a
considerably higher proportion of immigrants than of native-born
persons was employed, increasing the per capita output of goods
and services. Although immigrants were somewhat less skilled, and
presumably less productive, than domestic workers, high per-capita
labor-force participation more than offset this disadvantage. Sec-
ond, the cost of raising and educating children in the United States
was reduced because most immigrants came as young adults. By
1912, estimates place the savings attributable to importing human
capital at between 13% and 42% of the capital stock in the Ameri-
can economy.14 Immigration thus not only provided a source of la-
bor supply and skills, but contributed to the formation of capital
that accelerated the rate of development. Finally, economies of
scale associated with a larger labor force in the production of goods
also contributed to the nation's per capita income growth.
II. Economic Effects of Immigration Constraints Since 1921
Since the end of World War I, numerous immigration laws have
been enacted by Congress. The most significant laws from an eco-
nomic perspective have been the Immigration Act of 1924 (the 1924
Immigration Act), the Immigration and Nationality Acts of 1952 and
1965 (the 1952 Immigration Act and the 1965 Immigration Act),
and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). 15
These laws have several notable characteristics in common. First,
with the exception of IRCA which was aimed at curtailing illegal im-
migration, the intent of each was to restrict legal immigration to the
13. P. Hill, The Economic Impact of Immigration into the United States 36 (1975).
14. Neal & Uselding, Immigration, a Neglected Source of American Economic
Growth: 1790 to 1912, 24 Oxford Economic Papers 68-88 (1972).
15. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 139, 43 Stat. 153 (1924); Immigration and
Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 166 (1952); Immigration and Nationality Act-
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965); Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) .
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United States.' 6 Therefore, admissions criteria-who should be al-
lowed to enter-are an important component of each measure. Sec-
ond, none of the legislation was enacted principally in response to
economic pressures. These laws, without exception, were passed
during periods of economic expansion. Finally, each act was a polit-
ical remedy resulting from social concerns.
The absence of significant economic pressures leading to enact-
ment of these laws does not suggest that the economic conse-
quences of their passage were insignificant. The size and
composition of the American labor force, particularly in urban ar-
eas, were substantially affected by these measures. However, the
significance of immigration-related labor force changes differs over
time as a result of shifts in the nation's economic structure, techno-
logical standing, and demographic profile.
Common to all the legislation examined in this Article is the re-
striction of the free flow of labor, causing a lower rate of aggregate
economic growth than that likely to have been achieved in the ab-
sence of limitations. The nation's share of the world's economy has
therefore declined, but the significance of this fact may be more
political than economic.' 7 Since the 1920s, the United States has
chosen to assign the most weight to non-economic factors-social,
political, and environmental-in formulating immigration policy. In
part, Congress has made conscious political decisions responding to
public sentiment, which generally favors restrictive policies. Unfor-
tunately, the economic effects of limiting immigration and applying
non-economic admission criteria have rarely been the subject of a
public debate likely to influence voter perceptions of immigrant
contributions. There is a dearth of studies on this admittedly diffi-
cult to quantify subject. However, an understanding of how immi-
gration laws have interacted with the economy can provide one basis
for future policy deliberations.
A. The 1921 and 1924 Immigration Acts
The 1921 Immigration Act' 8 imposed as a temporary measure a
ceiling of 358,000 immigrants yearly, with half the quota allocated
16. The 1952 Act was essentially passive in its restrictions. Its primary effect was
retention of the status quo in regard to the national origins system and unrestricted
entry from the western hemisphere.
17. The ability of the United States (or other nations) to affect the policies of foreign
countries depends, in part, on their relative economic strength. Japan, for example, has
gained considerable political leverage as a result of its economic strength.




to the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Scandinavian nations.' 9
The more restrictive 1924 measure reduced the maximum annual
influx to 164,667, based on the 1890 census distribution of popula-
tion by national origin.20 The United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany,
and Scandinavia were allowed 133,075 admissions, or 81% of the
total. Total annual gross admissions from eastern Europe, Italy,
and Greece, the nations most severely constrained by these limits,
did exceed quota limits during the 1920s, because wives, husbands,
and unmarried children under the age of 21 of United States citi-
zens could enter as nonimmigrants.
The 1924 Immigration Act, with minor exceptions, made no ex-
plicit provision to give admission preference to persons with partic-
ular skills or talents. 2' Nonetheless, the proportion of professional
and skilled workers who entered during the 1920s was higher than
in earlier decades.
Although immigration restrictions imposed by Congress in 1921
and 1924 were not primarily linked to economic issues, several im-
mediate and long-term economic consequences of the legislation
emerged. Among the adverse initial effects of limiting the inflow of
eastern and southern Europeans was a reduction in the demand for
housing and consumer goods in the urban areas where most of
these immigrants settled. The timing of the restrictions was particu-
larly unfortunate. Curtailed demand for goods and services and the
resulting decline in investment coincided with the farm crisis, bank
failures, rising tariffs, reduced capital flows, and the stock market
collapse precipitating the Great Depression.
Had immigration remained unconstrained, an estimated 2.9 mil-
lion more aliens would have entered the United States during the
1920s. 22 Their arrival would have stimulated the demand for
19. The 1921 Immigration Act specified that the number of aliens to be admitted
would be limited to 3% of the number of foreign-born persons of such nationality resi-
dent in the United States, as determined by the U.S. Census of 1910. This number was
calculated as 357,803. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical
Abstract of the United States 1940, at 104 table 106 (1941) [hereinafter 1940 Statistical
Abstract].
20. Id.
21. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 139, at 56, 43 Stat. 153, 155 (1924). Min-
isters and college professors were exempt. In fact, only about 1,000 persons were ad-
mitted because of their professional occupations.
22. The 2.9 million number is based on total estimated net immigration from south-
ern and eastern Europe between 1900 and 1914, excluding most immigrants from Rus-
sia (USSR) on the premise that few such persons could emigrate between 1920 and 1924
and practically none after 1925. The average net inflow between 1901 and 1914 is com-
pared to the actual net inflow each year from 1921 to 1929. The difference, it is as-
sumed, would be the level of potential immigration that did not take place. One study
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housing and consumer goods. By itself, increased demand for
goods and services could possibly have delayed, but would not have
prevented, the onset of the Great Depression. Changes in fiscal and
monetary policies would also have been necessary, and these would
not have been directly affected by immigrant flow. Nonetheless,
several factors have been identified that link the onset and severity
of the Great Depression to the immigration controls imposed in the
1920s. These include a slowdown in construction, a drop in the
world market price of agricultural products, and an increased de-
pendence by Europe and Canada on United States capital. 23
The extent to which additional immigration-induced investment
would have reduced the severity of the Depression, particularly in
northern cities, remains speculative. The California experience,
however, suggests that new residents coming to northern cities
might have mitigated the downturn. During the 1930s, California's
urban areas continued to attract native-born migrants whose pres-
ence spurred considerable private and public construction. Be-
tween 1930 and 1940, California increased its population by 21.7%
from 5,677,000 to 6,907,000, compared to growth in the balance of
the nation of only 6.6% from 117.1 million to 124.8 million.24 Pop-
ulation growth was primarily due to in-migration between 1935 and
1940 when 665,000 more persons moved to California than left the
state. 25 For every person who left, more than four entered Califor-
nia in this five year interval. Net migration to California was twice
the level of all net migration to other states. 26 In 1929, per capita
income in California was $995, 41.5% above the national average;
by 1940, it fell to $889, still 41.2% above the national mean.27 Cali-
fornia was able to absorb large numbers of migrants and maintain a
living standard more than 40% better than the rest of the country.
estimated in 1930 a surplus of 26 million persons in eastern Europe, and 9 million in
southern Europe. Estimated net immigration to the United States in the absence of
constraints could have absorbed less than 10% of the surplus. See W. Moore, Economic
Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe 63, 64 table 6 (1972).
23. For the most comprehensive account of the relationship between immigration
and the depression, see B. Thomas, Migration and Economic Growth 191-201 (2d ed.
1973). The link between immigration constraints and capital flow is also noted in H.
Fleisig, Long Term Capital Flows and the Great Depression: The Role of the United
States 144 (1975).
24. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 2 Sixteenth Census of the
United States 26 table 7 (1943).
25. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, Sixteenth Census of the United
States, Internal Migration 1935 to 1940, Color and Sex of Migrants 18 table 8 (1943).
26. Id.




Favorable economic conditions can be attributed to several factors,
including bountiful natural resources and productive land. But the
state's dynamic population-California attracted large numbers of
internal migrants and immigrants during each decade since the
eighteenth century-contributed to its well-being. In 1940, 13.4%
of all its residents were foreign-born, about 50% above the national
average. Between 1935 and 1940, California attracted 15% of all
employed immigrants who came to the country.28 Recent immi-
grants to California were twice as likely to be college graduates than
other residents, and, when compared to non-migrants, a somewhat
higher percentage of internal migrants and immigrants held jobs. 29
However, in the poorest areas of the nation, especially the South
which in fact attracted very few immigrants, the direct economic ef-
fects of increased immigration would have been only marginal.
Net immigration to the United States during the Great Depres-
sion, even in the absence of restrictive legislation that established
national origin quotas, would have fallen substantially below the
level of the previous decade as unemployment reached unprece-
dented levels and made the United States a less promising haven for
job seekers. Nonetheless, some groups were adversely affected by
the national origin quota system in the 1930s. Central Europeans,
principally professionals, entrepreneurs, and skilled workers, were
seeking refuge from repression in their native countries. The note-
worthy contributions of the immigrants fleeing persecution who
were admitted to the United States during the late 1930s suggest
that entry of a central European middle class in larger numbers
would have further enriched all aspects of American life.30
Hastening and deepening the Depression was a subtle, immediate
effect of curtailed entry during the 1920s and 1930s, but other eco-
nomic consequences were manifested with the onset of World War
II. Limited immigration reduced the potential pool of workers
needed as the United States prepared for and entered the war. Fol-
lowing the attack on Pearl Harbor, the presence of draft-age immi-
grants would have expanded the pool of citizens available for the
armed forces. Other immigrants would have joined the labor force,
28. Bureau of Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Sixteenth Census of the United
States, Internal Migration 1935 to 1940, Economic Characteristics of Migrants 9 table 4,
72-73 table 15 (1946).
29. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Sixteenth Census of the United
States, Internal Migration 1935 to 1940, Social Characteristics of Migrants 114-15 table
23 (1946).
30. For a discussion of immigration during the 1930s, see L. Fermi, Illustrious Immi-
grants (1968).
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either working in munitions factories or performing other tasks to
support the war effort. While the final outcome of World War II
may not have been seriously in doubt once the United States fully
mobilized, the conflict might have ended with fewer casualties if
more soldiers had been in uniform and if the production of military
hardware had been accelerated.
After World War II massive numbers of displaced persons from
eastern and central Europe were anxious for resettlement. Those
not physically displaced faced economic uncertainty and might have
contemplated emigrating to the United States. However, restrictive
immigration policies made massive, legal resettlement impossible.3'
Without legal limitations, immigration from Europe to the United
States between 1945 and 1965 would have totaled several million
more persons than were actually admitted, probably following the
occupational profile of those admitted. Between 1946 and 1950
most immigrants were European, and 16% of all entering immi-
grants were professionals, as compared to 9% of the American work
force.3 2 The percentage who were craftsmen and skilled workers
was somewhat higher than among native workers.3 3 These statistics
suggest that admission of persons desiring entry to the United
States in the 1940s would have raised the average quality of the
American work force.
In addition to the direct wartime and post-war effects of reduced
immigration, entry limits between the 1920s and the 1960s pro-
duced more subtle, long-term consequences. These effects in-
cluded reduced rates of aggregate economic growth, acceleration in
the movement from rural to urban areas, and widening disparities
between central cities and suburban areas. High domestic birth
rates, an increase in the number of women in the labor force, and
rural out-migration provided the urban labor force necessary to
maintain substantial economic growth without immigration until the
mid-1960s. Technological advancements achieved during World
War II, combined with damages sustained by industrial facilities in
western Europe and Japan, gave the United States a competitive
edge in the world market for two decades. Thus, favorable
economic conditions temporarily masked both shifts in internal
31. The United States admitted only 352,000 displaced persons between 1948 and
1955 who could not have qualified under the national origin quota.
32. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United
States 1956, at 97 table 108, 200 table 240 (1956).




migration related to fewer immigrants and the need for additional
foreign-born talent to maintain high levels of economic growth.
The relocation of households from the urban core to larger, more
comfortable living quarters in suburban communities has been ob-
served since the late nineteenth century. Prior to the 1930s, new
immigrants seeking inexpensive housing in the inner city claimed
units vacated by upwardly mobile families. These immigrants both
provided a pool of low-wage workers for manufacturing plants in
the city and became entrepreneurs who started small businesses. As
immigration slowed, however, a surplus of older housing led to a
deterioration of inner-city neighborhoods and depressed the de-
mand for new urban housing. Similarly, the formation of new enter-
prises was curtailed and economic activity declined. Thus, older
cities were hurt by the dearth of immigrants who previously had pe-
riodically invigorated older neighborhoods.
Curtailed immigration did have positive effects on two groups-
unskilled job holders and rural blacks. Wage disparities between
unskilled and skilled workers may have been reduced, as the ab-
sence of aliens created job opportunities for native-born workers
with limited skills in northern urban areas.3 4 Employment prospects
and the availability of affordable housing triggered a substantial mi-
gration of southern rural blacks to the inner core of northern cities.
Net black out-migration from the South totaled 878,700 during the
1920s.3 5 This migration led to higher income, better housing, and
greater occupational mobility for blacks. 36
Although these groups gained from lower immigration, they were
not the intended beneficiaries of the legislation. The dominant
political motivation for the enacted restrictions was to maintain a
population in northern states with predominately northern and
western European ancestry. This political effort appeared success-
ful in the short run. However, reduced alien entry ultimately con-
tributed to a sharp rise in the non-white population in northern
34. There is some disagreement as to why unskilled worker wages climbed more
slowly than did those of skilled workers. For data on wage differentials and possible
causes during periods of rapid immigration prior to the late 1920s, seeJ. Isaac, Econom-
ics of Migration 201 (1947). Wage differentials are shown in W. Coombs, The Wages of
Unskilled Labor in Manufacturing Industries in the United States, 1890-1924, at 119
table 12 (1926).
35. E. Lee, A. Miller, C. Brainerd & R. Easterlin, 1 Population Redistribution and
Economic Growth, United States 1870-1950, at 89 table 1.14 (1957).
36. See, e.g., S. Kuznets, supra note 10, at 7 (lower immigration levels opened up
employment opportunities for blacks).
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cities because of migration from the rural South, reducing the pro-
portion of the urban population with European origins.
B. The 1952 Immigration Act
The 1952 Immigration Act 3 7 was the result of renewed interest in
immigration in the post-war period. The Great Depression and
World War II made immigration a minor issue. But after the con-
flict ended, admission of displaced persons resulted in often acrimo-
nious congressional debates. Although over 300,000 refugees were
admitted outside the national origin quota, the 1952 Immigration
Act retained national origin as the primary basis for admission. The
1952 Immigration Act, however, did introduce the concept of giving
preference to immigrants who possessed skills and talent needed in
the United States. One half of all the visas in the highest priority
category could be issued to such persons.
3 8
Specifically, the 1952 Immigration Act gave preference to persons
with education and training that would benefit the economy, cul-
tural interests, and welfare of the United States. This provision was
incorporated partly because of labor shortages in some occupations
during the early 1950s.3 9 In fact, the percentage of immigrants ad-
mitted under this preferential provision was small. 40 The reason for
this is unclear. Although'the 1952 Immigration Act allowed the De-
partment of Labor to refuse certification for the admission of non-
relative immigrants if their entry would have an adverse effect on
wages or working conditions of American workers, this provision
was used infrequently to restrict the flow.
4'
A more significant economic aspect of the 1952 law was that it
continued to allow essentially unrestricted entry from the western
hemisphere. Between 1950 and 1970, 2.7 million persons entered
from this hemisphere-1.9 million excluding Canada-partially off-
setting the absence of the unskilled and semi-skilled labor provided
by European immigrants prior to the 1930s. 42 Many of the labor
37. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 166 (1952).
38. Pub. L. No. 414, § 203(a), 66 Stat. 178 (1952).
39. See Hearings Before the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion, House Comm. on thejudiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 633 (1952).
40. U.S. Nat'l Comm'n for Manpower Policy, Manpower and Immigration Policies in
the United States 32-33 (1978). The report indicates that in 1964 only 8% of all immi-
grants entered as preference workers.
41. Id. at 34.
42. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United
States 1976, at 104 table 165 (1977).
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needs of growing urban centers were met by the combination of im-
migrants from the western hemisphere and of migrants from rural
areas; however, this source of immigrant labor did not cause the
need for highly skilled and professional workers to abate. The
post-World War II economic boom in western European nations re-
duced the incentive for skilled workers from those nations to emi-
grate, although many of them could have been admitted to the
United States under the 1924 quota system. On the other hand, im-
migration by skilled workers who might have been motivated by
economic or political considerations remained constrained by the
national origin provisions.
The political objective of the 1952 Immigration Act-to preserve
the ethnic composition of immigrants and, by extension, of the na-
tion's population-was largely achieved, but at a price. The contin-
ued exclusion of talented individuals from Asia and other parts of
the world cost the United States numerous individuals who could
have excelled in this country.
C. The 1965 Immigration Act
The 1965 Immigration Act 43 was enacted at the height of the Civil
Rights movement and during a time of great domestic prosperity.
Its enactment was neither in response to economic conditions nor
intended to significantly increase the level of immigration. Passage
was a response to exhortations by John F. Kennedy during his presi-
dency, coupled with strong support within the Johnson administra-
tion and an upbeat national mood. The deliberations did not
include the examination of economic effects likely to result from ex-
panding the pool of immigrants. 44
The main objective of the legislation was to repeal the national
origins provisions in effect since 1921, to admit immigrants on an
equitable basis regardless of origin, and to make family reunification
the primary basis for eligibility. Although the new numerical ceiling
of 170,000 immigrants was only slightly above the level set under
the 1952 Immigration Act, two provisions enacted in 1965 had sig-
nificant economic consequences. First, to allay the concerns of or-
ganized labor that immigrants might compete with Americans for
jobs, Congress incorporated a provision that only a limited number
43. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911
(1965). The 1965 legislation amended key sections of the 1952 Immigration Act.
44. Proponents limited their comments essentially to the protection of American la-
bor. See Immigration: Hearings on H.R. 2580 Before the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 321-22 (1965).
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of potential workers, other than those joining families, would be ad-
mitted. The Department of Labor would be required to certify that
each admitted worker was needed and would not displace Ameri-
cans.45 Family reunification replaced the entry preferences of the
1952 Immigration Act based on individual skill and ability. The em-
phasis on family reunification, in addition to satisfying organized la-
bor and gaining its support for the measure, was socially motivated.
Various groups opposed to the abolition of the national origin sys-
tem promoted the family reunification approach because it was be-
lieved likely to primarily permit entry of persons of northern and
western European origin who were favored by the 1924 Immigra-
tion Act.
46
The second economically significant provision of the 1965 legisla-
tion placed an annual ceiling of 120,000 on admissions from the
western hemisphere. This action, as will be noted later, encouraged
illegal entry from Latin America and the Caribbean. In fact, the
number of entrants from these regions, both legal and illegal, in-
creased following the imposition of limits.
Contrary to congressional expectations at the time of passage, the
1965 Immigration Act affected both the level of immigration and
the labor characteristics of new aliens. 47 The increase in legal immi-
gration is attributable to the admission of more refugees and aliens
eligible for entry as immediate relatives of United States citizens and
therefore exempt from the mandated ceiling. The number of alien
family members who are not counted toward the immigration ceil-
ing continues to climb. The fact that a high proportion of Asians
and Hispanics who are admitted to the United States apply for the
entry of their immediate relatives accounts for the continued
increase.
In recent years, the annual addition to the labor force from the
ranks of legal immigrants has totaled more than 300,000 persons of
45. As indicated by Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) during the floor debate on H.R.
2580, to amend the 1952 Immigration Act, the primary responsibility is placed on the
applicant to obtain a visa establishing that there are insufficient workers at the requested
destination. See 111 Cong. Rec. 24764-65 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1965) (statement by Sena-
tor Kennedy).
46. V. Briggs, Jr., Immigration Policy and the American Labor Force 69 (1984).
47. The State Department predicted that a few years after the law would go into
effect immigration from outside the western hemisphere would fall to 105,000-110,000
annually. This compares to the average of 98,000 under the 1952 Immigration Act.
Therefore, annual immigration levels would not be significantly changed by the 1965





prime working age, 15 to 44 years old. Approximately 64% of im-
migrants fall into this age category, compared to 47% of the total
American population. 48 The characteristics of immigrant workers
have changed as a result of the 1965 law, which made possible a
sharp rise in immigration from Asia and, to a lesser extent, the Mid-
dle East and Africa.
49
The most visible economic impact of new immigration is associ-
ated with Asians. Their success as entrepreneurs and as profession-
als in science, engineering, and health care in universities and in
industry is particularly notable. This growth in entrepreneurs and
professionals can be linked directly to the immigration reforms of
the 1965 Immigration Act, which became fully effective in July 1968.
The level of entrepreneurial activity among Asians was unex-
pected and is surprising because in 1980 three-fourths of the Asian
population in the United States were immigrants who had resided in
this country for less than 15 years. In 1982, the nation's 200,000
Asian-owned firms recorded a sales volume of $15 billion,50 with an
average of one enterprise for every twenty-five Asian residents.
Three metropolitan areas-Los Angeles, New York, and San Fran-
cisco-were home to 66,000 Asian firms with $5 billion in sales.
The level of Asian entrepreneurial activity is particularly striking
when compared to the activity of black-owned firms. Although
blacks outnumbered Asians in total population by almost six to one
in 1982, the 339,000 black firms generated only $13 billion in sales.
The inflow of Asian entrepreneurs is expanding commercial activ-
ity in nearly all American cities as Chinese, Indian, Korean, and
Vietnamese small businesses proliferate. These firms are found not
only in traditional centers of immigrant activity but also in cities
such as Atlanta and Oklahoma City, where no sizable immigrant en-
claves have ever existed. Asian immigrants have spurred capital in-
vestment generated from their own profits as well as from funds
channeled by Asian banks and private overseas investors. Asian in-
terests are developing new urban shopping centers in central city
48. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 1987 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service 28 table 13 (1988) [hereinafter 1987 INS Yearbook]; U.S. Dep't ofJustice,
1986 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 25 table 12
(1987) [hereinafter 1986 INS Yearbook].
49. The total annual Asian and African quota between 1924 and 1952 was only
about 2,600, and it continued to be small for another decade. See, e.g., 1940 Statistical
Abstract, supra note 19, at 104 table 106.
50. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Survey of Minority-Owned Busi-
ness Enterprises 1982, at 2 table A (1986).
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neighborhoods that had been devoid of new investment for de-
cades. Although their presence in minority neighborhoods is often
controversial, there is little doubt that immigrant enterprises have
expanded inner-city commercial activity.
Perhaps a more important result of the 1965 Immigration Act has
been the increase in the number of professionals, including scien-
tists and engineers, emigrating to the United States from Asian na-
tions. 5' Between 1970 and 1982, more than 215,000 such
immigrants were classified as professionals, or 74% of all immi-
grants from third world countries. 52 In fiscal 1986, Asian countries
accounted for about one-half of all professional workers entering
the United States, while European nations accounted for just under
one-fifth. 53 Asian immigrants have attained education levels well
above the United States national average, with well over one-third
holding at least a bachelor's degree. In northern states, 44% had
attended four or more years of college. 54
The contribution of the Asian professional class to the economic
well-being of the United States has been considerable, particularly
in light of the continuing shortage of scientific and technical profes-
sionals. The flow of non-European immigrants has partially offset
the inability of the United States educational system to produce a
sufficient number of technical professionals with advanced
degrees. 5
5
The number of Hispanic immigrants has also risen, but this in-
crease is unrelated to the 1965 Immigration Act. These workers
would have continued to immigrate, probably in even larger num-
bers, in the absence of limits on their entry. Immigrants from the
western hemisphere, particularly Mexico and the Caribbean, pro-
vide a labor pool for factories. Workers are needed in labor-inten-
sive, relatively low-wage industries such as apparel, textile, and
leather goods where foreign competition is keen. For example, in
the booming Los Angeles apparel industry, most of the 80,000
51. By 1982, 17% of all scientists and engineers in the United States were foreign-
born and approximately 25% of this total were Asian. See National Science Board, Sci-
ence Indicators: The 1985 Report 56.
52. Vasegh-Daneshvary, Schlottmann & Herzog, Immigration of Engineers, Scien-
tists and Physicians and the U.S. High Technology Renaissance, 68 Soc. Sci. Q. 311, 313
(1987).
53. 1986 INS Yearbook, supra note 48, at 36 table 18.
54. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1980 Census of Population,
Detailed Population Characteristics 1-19 to 1-39 table 313A (1984).
55. Penner, Tapping the Wave of Talented Immigrants, Issues in Sci. & Tech.,




workers employed in 1986 were female illegal aliens. 56 The availa-
bility of such workers is allowing numerous enterprises to compete
effectively with foreign firms during, a period of economic expansion
when few native-born workers can be attracted to low-paying factory
jobs.5
7
New immigrants seeking affordable housing also contribute to the
revitalization of deteriorating inner-city neighborhoods, sharply in-
creasing property values and local tax revenue. Unfortunately, this
process has reduced the number of moderate-income units available
to native inner-city residents. The shortage of new public housing
in the 1980s has compounded the affordability problem, leaving
poor native-born minorities with few options.
An unanticipated effect of the 1965 Immigration Act was an in-
crease in illegal immigration. The Asian businesses proliferating in
virtually every city and suburb seek more Asian workers than can be
found among legal immigrants. Language and cultural ties as well
as a willingness to work long hours at modest pay encourage Asian
businesses to seek undocumented workers. Chinese and other eth-
nic restaurants are classic examples of essentially minimum-wage,
labor-intensive enterprises that provide jobs for illegal aliens with-
out displacing American workers. Jobs for illegal aliens are also
found in Korean, Portuguese, and other ethnic enterprises.
The increase in legal and illegal entry from the western hemi-
sphere results from both push and pull conditions. First, western
hemisphere immigration was limited under the 1965 Immigration
Act, and at almost the same time the Bracero program, which had
been initiated after World War II to provide temporary agricultural
workers, was repealed. 58 This program had created between
192,000 and 438,000 jobs annually for aliens, establishing a "pull"
factor that encouraged illegal entry, particularly from Mexico. Sec-
ond, deteriorating economic conditions and unstable political sys-
tems "push" young persons away from their native countries and
56. See Cole, Abundance of Space, Cheap Labor Pool Boosts Local Manufacturing
Employment, Los Angeles Bus. J., Dec. 1, 1986, at 8.
57. It is estimated that 52,000 jobs in competitive industries were added to the Los
Angeles region by Mexican immigrant jobs that otherwise would not have existed. See T.
Muller & T. Espenshade, The Fourth Wave 151 (1985).
58. The Bracero program was authorized by Act ofJuly 12, 1951, Pub. L. No. 78, 65
Stat. 119. The program's authorization was extended by amendment several times but
was allowed to expire on December 31, 1964. Congressional Research Service, Report
to the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Illegal Aliens: Analysis and
Background 50-55 (Comm. Print 1977), reprinted in T. Aleinikoff & D. Martin, Immigra-
tion: Process and Policy 748 (1985).
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encourage them to enter the United States-either legally or ille-
gally-in the hope of securing one of the growing number of un-
skilled and semi-skilled jobs. Poorly guarded borders and reduced
transportation costs have further stimulated this flow of illegal
aliens.
In retrospect, the 1965 Immigration Act was successful in its
political aim-to more equitably allocate the limited number of visas
available for entry to the United States. The change in the geo-
graphic, ethnic, and racial distribution of immigrants since the en-
actment of the measure shows that this objective was achieved.
From an aggregate economic perspective, the 1965 Immigration Act
must also be rated a plus, because the immigrant flow resulting from
its provisions stimulated economic growth. Had the national origins
provisions of the 1920s remained intact, immigrants from nations
outside western Europe and the western hemisphere would have
represented only a small proportion of all aliens entering the United
States during the last two decades. Elimination of the quota system
allowed entrepreneurial activity to flourish and enabled large num-
bers of technical personnel with advanced degrees to join American
industry. The influx from Asia and from the western hemisphere
has been complementary: economic activity induced by Asian enter-
prise and capital investment stimulates the demand for service-
sector jobs.
No studies have directly examined the effects of recent immigra-
tion on per capita income, but it is likely that such income has risen
faster in some communities than it would have without the inflow of
immigrants. Per capita income in places with the largest concentra-
tions of immigrants-Los Angeles County, New York City, and San
Francisco-has risen more rapidly during the last 10 years than in
other urban areas.59 Several factors may contribute to the dispro-
portionate increase. The proportion of professional workers among
recent entrants exceeds their percentage of the total labor force,
59. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 3 Local Area Personal
Income 1977-1982 table 1 (metropolitan U.S.), table 5 (New York) (1984); Bureau of
Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 9 Local Area Personal Income 1977-1982
table 1 (metropolitan U.S.), table 5 (California) (1984); Bureau of Economic Analysis,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 3 Local Area Personal Income 1981-1986 table 1 (metropoli-
tan U.S.), table 5 (New York) (1986); Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Com-





and income of Asian immigrants is well above the national aver-
age.60 The proportion of entering Asian immigrants between the
ages of 18 and 44, the prime working years, exceeds the proportion
in the native population. Above-average employment rates and cap-
ital accumulation strengthen local economies, contributing to their
economic development. Although income growth in immigrant
centers may not be directly enhanced by the immigrant population,
the presence of immigrants does not appear to constrain such
growth.
Per capita income statistics provide no information on income dis-
tribution, but it is reasonable to assume that economic gains from
immigration are distributed unequally. Among the principal gainers
are businesses that employ immigrants and middle-class households
that utilize services provided by these workers.
Several potentially negative economic consequences of higher im-
migration levels, other than distributional effects, require comment.
At the time of the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act, organized
labor was anxious to limit the entry of persons likely to become ac-
tive workers, fearing higher unemployment and lower wages for
Americans, particularly union members. In retrospect union fears
may not have been justified. No evidence exists that unemployment
rates for native workers have risen measurably in areas where un-
documented and other Hispanic immigrants are concentrated.
6'
Wage rates have been affected, but it is not certain whether the
impact is short or long term. In southern California, wages of un-
skilled workers were depressed during the 1970s, and this condition
has been attributed to the presence of immigrant labor. 62 Unskilled
native-born Hispanics appear to have borne the brunt of lower
wages. On the other hand, a recent study in the Southwest shows
that undocumented workers have little impact on worker earnings
regardless of race.
63
60. Immigrants collectively earn only 3% less than native workers. The median
earnings of Asian immigrants exceed those of native whites. Asian immigrants are 48%
more likely to earn high incomes ($35,000 or more in 1983) than native whites. See
Sehgal, Foreign Born in U.S. Labor Market: Results of a Special Survey, Monthly Labor
Rev.,July 1985, at 21-22.
61. For a discussion of recent immigration effects on unskilled worker wages in Cali-
fornia and black workers nationally, see T. Muller & T. Espenshade, supra note 57, at
151-55.
62. Id. at 148-51.
63. Bean, Lowell & Taylor, Undocumented Mexican Immigrants and the Earnings of
Other Workers in the United States, 25 Demography 35 (1988).
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In New York City between 1974 and 1980, a period when close to
half a million immigrants came to the city, wages were also de-
pressed. 64 However, the primary cause for lower than average wage
growth in the late 1970s appears to be economic stagnation in the
area, with immigration only a secondary factor. In the 1980s, 16%
of the nation's legal immigrants settled in the New York area
although only 3.5% of the nation's population resides there-indi-
cating very heavy immigrant concentration. 65 Wage statistics from
the 1980s indicate that wages in all sectors, including nondurable
manufacturing and services where immigrants are over-represented,
rose in the city above the national average.66 These data suggest
that during periods of economic stagnation or slow growth, such as
in the late 1970s, large-scale immigration will have a depressive ef-
fect on wages. But when an expanding economy creates a tight la-
bor market, wages are less sensitive to the influx of additional alien
workers. Such a conclusion based on the recent past is consistent
with an earlier analysis that finds relatively small effects of immigra-
tion, both legal and undocumented, on native population
earnings.
67
Not all researchers subscribe to these benign findings. For exam-
ple, the labor economist Briggs argues that there has been a shift in
the occupational structure of immigrants from professional to un-
skilled workers since 1970. For this reason, he questions the results
of earlier studies. Briggs believes native worker wages are adversely
affected by illegal immigrants, but provides no research findings to
support this view. 68
Another potentially adverse consequence of immigration is that
concentrations of immigrants in low-wage, low-skill jobs will dis-
courage employers from introducing labor-saving equipment. This
concern is understandable, given that growth of manufacturing out-
put per hour in the United States lags well behind that in Japan, and
is rising less quickly than in France, Italy, and Germany. Growth of
64. Papademetriou & Muller, Recent Immigration to New York: Labor Market and
Social Policy Issues Report 70 table IV-5 (Nat'l Comm. for Employment Policy, 1987).
65. For recent immigration levels to the New York area, see U.S. Dep't of Justice,
1985 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 59 table IMM
5.3; 1987 INS Yearbook, supra note 48, at 36 table 18.
66. Papademetriou & Muller, supra note 64, at 70.
67. Borjas & Tienda, The Economic Consequences of Immigration, 235 Science
646, 646-48 (Feb. 6, 1987).
68. V. Briggs, Jr., supra note 46, at 164-65. He concludes, based on a San Diego
survey showing employers prefer illegal workers, that Americans are therefore dis-
placed. However, the fact of hiring illegal aliens does not indicate whether native work-




compensation per hour also lags behind other major industrial na-
tions.69 However, this author's examination of capital expenditures
in metropolitan areas and industries with a large immigrant pres-
ence, compared to those of similar industries across the nation,
finds no relationship between immigrant employment and capital
outlay. For example, capital investment per employee in the Los
Angeles and San Francisco apparel industry in 1972 and 1982 was
above the national mean, but in New York City, below average. 70 In
other immigrant-filled industries, the investment pattern also differs
from locale to locale, suggesting that factors other than the percent-
age of immigrants in the labor force influence the decision to invest
capital.
There also is concern that insufficient research and development
dollars are invested in the private sector due to the availability of
cheap immigrant labor. However, under-investment in research and
development can be attributed to several causes, including federal
tax policy, the clamor for short-term corporate profit, and the focus
on defense-related industries. Also, the sectors of the economy
most requiring investment in research to remain competitive do not
include furniture or women's dresses (industries where immigrants
are concentrated), but do include computer chip and transportation
equipment industries (where immigrants are not over-represented).
More rapid immigration, as noted earlier, should actually encourage
investment, because society saves both child-rearing expenses, and
outlays for the elderly.
7'
For over a century, the nation has worried that immigrants can
impose undue costs on government by requiring more welfare serv-
ices than native-born residents. For this reason, persons who would
become "public charges" have been excluded from entering the
69. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United
State 1988, at 813 table 1405 (1988).
70. See, e.g., Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 2 Census of Manufac-
turers 1972, at 5-19 table 6 (California), 33-47 table 8 (New York); Bureau of the Cen-
sus, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 3 Census of Manufacturers (1982), at 21-59 table 6
(California), 67-85 table 8 (New York).
71. See 1987 INS Yearbook, supra note 48, at 28 table 13; Bureau of the Census, U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1987, at 23 table 26 (1987).
In 1977, 73% of legal immigrants were between the ages of 15 and 64. The percentage
below the age of 14 and over the age of 65 in 1987 was 23%, compared to 32% for the
general population. In theory, therefore, investment in recent years should have been
higher than in the absence of immigration.
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United States since passage of the 1882 Immigration Act. 72 In con-
sidering whether recent entrants are imposing a burden on taxpay-
ers, immigrants have to be grouped into four categories: refugees
(mainly from Southeast Asia), illegal entrants, low-income legal en-
trants (particularly Mexicans and Central Americans), and others.
Demographic and economic characteristics tend to differ among sta-
tus-refugee, legal, or illegal immigrant, and social services are
often made available only to aliens of a particular status. Los Ange-
les County, which has the highest number of refugees and illegal
aliens in the nation, maintains the most comprehensive data on wel-
fare outlays for its residents. In 1986, the county provided Assist-
ance to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to 58,250
refugees (mainly Southeast Asians), or nearly one-half of the esti-
mated 135,000 refugees in Los Angeles. The cost of providing so-
cial and educational services to Southeast Asian refugees in Los
Angeles and elsewhere can be expected to exceed tax payments
from this population. 73
Legal immigrants accounted for 36,010 recipients of AFDC aid in
Los Angeles County.74 Because of their low earnings and large fam-
ily size, Mexican immigrants to southern California pay less in taxes
than they receive in educational services.75 On the other hand, non-
refugee immigrants from Asia and many European nations are antic-
ipated to contribute more in revenue than they receive in services.
Tax contributions from these households are above average because
these immigrants typically earn more than native Americans and are
more likely to own their homes than others with similar income.
Concurrently, Asian immigrants (excluding those from Southeast
Asia) are about as likely to receive transfer payments as native
Americans.
Undocumented adults are not eligible for most government
assistance, but some nonetheless manage to obtain such aid. Their
native-born children, however, are citizens legally eligible to receive
72. An Act to Regulate Immigration, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (1882).
73. For a description of services received by refugees in several large cities, see
Papademetriou & Muller, supra note 64, at 82-107. Although no cost-revenue analysis
specifically aimed at the refugee population has been undertaken, this income character-
istic and the cost of services provided to this population indicate a fiscal deficit to federal
and state governments.
74. Attachment to memorandum from Eddy S. Tanaka to Supervisors (Feb. 13,
1986) (discussing records of foreign-born persons receiving assistance) (on file with the
author) [hereinafter Tanaka Memo].




payments and services. In Los Angeles, 20,606 children of undocu-
mented alien parents received AFDC payments in 1982. That
number had risen to 65,780 in late 1986, or 16% of all aided chil-
dren in the county.7 6 As illegal aliens are thought to comprise about
15% of the county's population, the rate of assistance is close to the
county average.
Taking the total immigrant population into consideration, New
York City's revenue contributions from immigrants were slightly be-
low average. 77 A reasonable conclusion to be drawn from available
sources is that new aliens collectively require a modest subsidy from
the nonimmigrant population in most cities. The level of subsidy
depends on the relative size of the refugee population and the eth-
nic composition of new immigrants. However, immigrant earnings
tend to rise more rapidly than earnings of nonimmigrants, eventu-
ally reducing or eliminating initial fiscal burdens.78
The 1965 Immigration Act with its emphasis on family reunifica-
tion did not cause a sharp rise in "public charges." But in large part
because the legislation did not fully meet labor needs, the flow of
illegal workers accelerated and brought with it related social
problems. This, in turn, led to new legislation aimed explicitly at
dealing with this problem.
D. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act
The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)79 passed
after lengthy debate, responding to public concern that the growing
level of illegal entry was posing legal and ethical problems for the
nation. Unlike earlier immigration measures, IRCA did not change
the level, point of origin, or form of legal immigration. The major
objective of the measure was to reduce illegal entry. Congress be-
lieved that the loophole in the 1952 Immigration Act geared to
western agriculture interests-the ability to hire illegal workers
without penalty-was the major culprit causing the rise in undocu-
mented workers.
The rationale for congressional action was primarily social and
political. Congress was responding to the existence of a shadow
76. Attachment to memorandum from Eddy S. Tanaka to Michael Myanovich (Dec.
10, 1986) (discussing AFDC to citizen children of undocumented alien parents) (on file
with author). The 1982 data is found in Tanaka Memo, supra note 74.
77. E. Bogen, Immigrants in New York City (1987).
78. Borjas & Tienda, supra note 67, at 646-48; Sehgal, supra note 60, at 21-22.
79. Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986)
[hereinafter IRCA].
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population of several million persons who entered the United States
without proper documentation, but who held legal jobs. Legislators
believed the situation could be corrected by imposing sanctions on
employers who knowingly hired such persons. Further, the knowl-
edge that over a million potential immigrants were awaiting legal
entry while others entered the United States and remained with im-
punity also swayed public sentiment. Finally, a subtle but unquan-
tifiable factor that helped spur passage of IRCA was the ethnicity of
most illegal aliens. Over 83% of all undocumented persons who
applied for legalization were Hispanics.80
In passing the legislation, Congress continued the twentieth cen-
tury pattern of giving priority to non-economic issues when consid-
ering immigration law revisions. Economic problems caused by
alien workers were not a prime motivation for IRCA. Although or-
ganized labor expressed some concern that undocumented workers
may have contributed to high unemployment during the 1981-1982
recession, their concerns faded as the economy rebounded. Seg-
ments of the business community, fearful that the needed supply of
workers would be threatened, opposed employer sanctions as did
the President's Economic Council. 8 '
A key provision of the 1986 legislation is the authorization of an
amnesty program to legalize the status of illegal aliens who estab-
lished residence in the United States before 1982. Government
agencies estimated, albeit incorrectly, that about one-half of all un-
documented persons-perhaps 3 million-would request and qual-
ify for legalization. Congress included the amnesty program in the
bill for humanitarian reasons, as well as to garner the support of
Hispanic groups needed to ensure the bill's passage. The legaliza-
tion program could also be seen as mitigating the economic conse-
quences of otherwise reducing the labor force by several million
illegal workers. In the absence of legalization, employer sanctions
could, at least theoretically, cause most illegal alien workers to lose
their jobs and leave the country. This, in turn, would have a devas-
tating impact on numerous firms depending on such workers.
80. Press Office, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Pre-1982 Legalization Ap-
plicants (Oct. 9, 1988) ("Summary Sheet of Selected Characteristics") (on file with au-
thor); press conference statement of Alan C. Nelson, Commissioner, Immigration and
Naturalization Service (May 5, 1988) (on file with author).
81. Pear, Reagan's Advisers Say Bill on Aliens Can Hurt Economy, N.Y. Times, Jan.
23, 1986, at Al. In response to political pressure, the final report transmitted to Con-
gress, although supporting immigration because of its positive contribution to the econ-
omy, did not criticize legislation aimed at curtailing illegal entry. See Economic Report




Although economic considerations generally were not given high
priority, a notable exception exists. Congress established a tempo-
rary agricultural worker program aimed at providing sufficient alien
workers to meet employer needs. 82 Eligibility requirements for
qualification as a special agricultural worker with temporary resi-
dence mandate only that the applicant worked for 90 days as an ag-
ricultural laborer in the United States during 1985-1986. Persons
who qualify as temporary residents may become permanent resi-
dents after three years.
83
Almost two years have elapsed since enactment of IRCA, suffi-
cient time to gain initial insight into both the effectiveness and the
economic impact of the statute. Reducing illegal entry to the United
States was the principal objective of the legislation. However, little
direct evidence is available to suggest that the rate of undocu-
mented entry has substantially slowed.
The number of apprehensions of persons entering the United
States along the Mexican border has declined from its peak, but
only modestly. About 1 million would-be immigrants are expected
to be caught at the Mexican and Canadian borders during 1988-a
higher number than apprehended in 1981 or 1982. Apprehensions
are just one indicator of how many persons enter and remain in the
United States without proper documentation because only a small
proportion of those who attempt to enter the United States illegally
are caught at the border. The more seasoned aliens find other less
risky means of entry. Nonetheless, border data suggest that em-
ployer sanctions have not discouraged clandestine entry. Numerous
press reports indicate that the surge of illegal entrants is continuing,
particularly from Mexico. 8
4
Anecdotal evidence from employers traditionally dependent on
undocumented workers does suggest that the illegal alien labor pool
has diminished. Interviews with restaurant and hotel management
and trade publications indicate that the supply of illegal workers is
82. IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, title III, part A, 100 Stat. 3359, 3411-34 (codified in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. & 26 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1986)).
83. IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 303(d)(2) (1986) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1161
(Supp. IV 1986)).
84. See, e.g., Rohter, Immigration Law is Failing to Cut Flow from Mexico, N.Y.
Times, June 24, 1988, at Al. See also Whitman, The Unstoppable Surge of Illegal Immi-
grants, U.S. News and World Report, June 6, 1988 at 36; Branigan, New Law Fails to
Stem Flow of Mexicans Into California, Washington Post, June 23, 1988, at A30. But see
General Accounting Office, Immigration Reform: Status of Implementing Employer
Sanctions After Second Year, Pub. No. B-125051, at 66-67 (suggesting that illegal bor-
der crossings decreased after IRCA).
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insufficient, resulting in critical labor shortages. 85 The perception
in the Washington, D.C., area is that fewer undocumented aliens are
available to work in 1988 as compared to two years earlier. Con-
trary to employer perceptions, the number of illegal aliens has prob-
ably not declined, with the exception of the 1.6 million aliens
participating in the legalization program. The registration of over
one million persons who claim to qualify as agricultural workers is
one suggestion of continuing large numbers of undocumented
workers.8 6 The large number of aliens who may be eligible for this
amnesty program, and the possibilities for fraud, may make these
obscure provisions the most controversial aspect of IRCA by al-
lowing many undocumented workers to legally enter the United
States.
87
Although employers fearing fines may be less willing to hire ille-
gal aliens, many employers' reluctance to hire undocumented work-
ers is offset by the decline in the number of native-born young
persons entering the labor force and the even smaller number of
new workers willing to consider low-wage, "dead-end" jobs. The
current shortage of unskilled workers may be unprecedented. De-
spite labor shortages during World War II, retail and service enter-
prises did find sufficient numbers of workers from the retired and
teenaged segments of the population to maintain operations with-
out substantial wage increases. Because the nation has become
more affluent during the last four decades, the traditional labor
sources are now more difficult to tap. The elderly draw pensions
while most teenagers are full-time students and unwilling to work.
The inability of small businesses to hire employees crucial for their
operations may compel owners to risk sanctions. The demand for
workers in the restaurant and hotel industries has accelerated, lead-
ing to the concern that many small businesses will be unable to
operate efficiently. 88 With unemployment in northeastern metro-
politan areas the. lowest in a decade, the temptation to hire illegal
aliens remains great as virtually every small business searches for
workers.
85. Acocha, Illegal Worker Ban Leaves Firms Hurting, Washington Post, June 6,
1988, at Al. See also Patrini, New Immigration Law Worsens Labor Woes, Hotel & Motel
Mgmt., July 25, 1988, at 2.
86. Applebome, Farm Law Abused by Illegal Aliens, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1988, at
Al.
87. Mattingly, Fraud Suspected in Farm Jobs Program, 20 Nat'lJ. 2410 (1988).




Within ethnic enclaves, the brisk business in falsified or stolen So-
cial Security cards, driver licenses, and other forms of identification
indicates that many illegal workers are purchasing needed identity
documents.89 Many undocumented workers who are not part of the
amnesty program find jobs with relatives and other co-ethnics within
ethnic enclaves, making them extremely difficult to apprehend.
Those who speak some English typically encounter few challenges
in using the various forms of documentation to verify their legal res-
idence, particularly since employers are not responsible for the au-
thenticity of identity documents. Very few illegal aliens from
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea applied for legalization, yet appar-
ently substantial numbers continue to work in large cities. 90
The Immigration Reform and Control Act's primary impact is on
undocumented workers, particularly those working for native-born
employers outside the ethnic enclave. Unquestionably, such work-
ers have more difficulty finding jobs with large organizations that
carefully scrutinize identity documents. In a few places, such as the
Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, employers have received
large fines for knowingly accepting fraudulent identity cards. But
these actions do not seem to have significantly deterred employers,
given their labor requirements and the willingness of undocu-
mented aliens to work in jobs unattractive to most Americans.
Evidence so far suggests that the 1986 measure is not achieving
its primary objective-permanently reducing the number of un-
documented workers.9 ' The economic self-interest of both employ-
ers and workers is often stronger than the bite of the immigration
laws. When the European flow was constrained in the 1920s, entry
was controlled more readily because virtually all immigrants came
by ship. Mass air travel and lengthy national borders that cannot be
fully screened for clandestine passage have severely limited the abil-
ity to control western hemisphere immigration at its source.
89. Whitman, supra note 84, at 37.
90. The total number of applicants for legalization as of October 1988 was: from
Korea, 5,900; from Taiwan, 3,900; and from Hong Kong, 2,300. The total number com-
prises only 0.7% of all applicants for the program. Most applicants entered legally but
overstayed their nonimmigrant visas. Telephone interview with Toni Lake, Press Of-
ficer, Immigration and Naturalization Service (Oct. 25, 1988). The low numbers imply
that numerous citizens of Asian nations working in the United States illegally have not
applied for legalization.
91. The number of undocumented workers decreased in 1988 as temporary resi-
dence status was granted to persons applying for amnesty. However, additional undocu-
mented workers who are entering the United States will probably eventually restore the
pre-amnesty level.
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From an economic perspective, distinct from a legal or social
view, the effects of continued illegal immigration are generally posi-
tive. During the economic expansion the nation has experienced in
recent years, illegal workers are needed to perform tasks most
Americans are unwilling to undertake. Employers gain advantages
by employing these workers, most of whom do not receive benefits
enjoyed by others such as vacation pay or health insurance. In a
period of economic contraction, many of these workers may return
to their countries of origin, as did immigrants in earlier, decades
when immigration was unconstrained.
From a legal and social perspective, the consequences of illegal
immigration are less positive. IRCA did not fully resolve the prob-
lem of an undocumented worker class lacking the same rights and
privileges as those employed legally. Concurrently, if unintention-
ally, IRCA added new classes of aliens some of which will cause legal
and social problems in future years. The first class, comprised of
individuals who entered illegally but were given amnesty and will
become eligible for permanent residence, presents no difficulties.
Another class is formed by persons who applied but were not quali-
fied for permanent residence and who may be deported. A third
and larger group, several million aliens who have entered since
1981, did not apply for amnesty but intend to remain in the United
States unless forced to leave. The fourth class is composed of tem-
porary agricultural workers. Among this latter group are many who,
like their predecessors in the Bracero program, will move to cities
and become part of the urban labor force. IRCA may also en-
courage some illegal aliens to remain in the United States during
periods of economic stagnation because of fears that, if they return
to their native land, reentry into the United States will be more diffi-
cult than it was before IRCA.
III. The Direction of Future Immigration Policy
This brief analysis of economic effects of immigration laws reveals
that the passage of various legislative acts has had a substantial im-
pact on the nation's economy. During the nineteenth century, the
effect of the policy of unrestricted entry was mostly, but not exclu-
sively, to provide large numbers of predominately unskilled and
semi-skilled workers to build infrastructure and expand industry.
Immigrants in this century increasingly have contributed skill and




been the source of considerable scientific, technical, en-
trepreneurial, and cultural talent. These skills are essential to main-
tain the nation's high living standard and its leadership role in the
world.
In recent decades the American economy has been undergoing
structural adjustments. Structural shifts in the economy, from reli-
ance on heavy industry and mass production of goods toward an
economy that requires more skilled labor, must be considered in
formulating future immigration policies. The business community
is justifiably worried about the decline of the American work force
as compared to its competitors. The strength of Japanese produc-
tion is the high literacy and educational level of its workers com-
pared to their counterparts in the United States-not massive
capital investment. 92 Current conditions point to the need in the
United States for more professional and skilled workers. At the
same time, a less-skilled labor force will continue to be needed to
provide services that are difficult to mechanize or automate. In the
manufacturing sector, unskilled immigrants will remain concen-
trated in industries difficult to automate, such as apparel, leather
goods, and furniture. The high standard of living in the United
States includes dining out, lodging at full-service hotels, having
household help when adults are employed outside the home, and
enjoying other labor-intensive amenities. Immigration policy
should be modified to reflect changes in the structure of the econ-
omy as well as to address needs that continue.
Many of the structural economic changes in the United States are
linked to the growing importance of international trade. Following
the Civil War, the American economy became essentially self-suffi-
cient. International competition was not a major concern, as the
United States consumed primarily goods manufactured within its
boundaries. The nation's ability to produce and attract from other
nations talented individuals was combined with a favorable political
climate that encouraged investment to assure technological domi-
nance. In the first half of the twentieth century, this nation's eco-
nomic and technical leadership was unchallenged. Thus, little
thought was given to the use of immigration laws to further the
goals of national economic growth.
Today's less favorable economic environment requires an exami-
nation of the current policy of family reunification and refugee sta-
tus as the dominant criteria for permanent entry to the United
92. Bus. Week, Sept. 19, 1988, at 101.
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States. The American technological edge is being eroded by others,
and to regain our standing, new approaches to improve the quality
of our human resources must be considered.
The United States retains one advantage in comparison to its two
main economic rivals, an economically integrated Europe across the
Atlantic and the Japanese industrial and financial power across the
Pacific. This strength is the nation's willingness and ability to attract
persons with talent and ambition from all regions of the globe. Us-
ing this advantage to substantially increase the flow of individuals
who can contribute the most to the national economy would im-
prove the quality of the work force. Greater emphasis on the eco-
nomic characteristics of potential immigrants can be supported by
both proponents and opponents of a more liberal entry policy.
93
In part, the problem of competitiveness facing the United States
stems from an insufficient supply of workers in technical occupa-
tions at the professional and skilled worker level. One pragmatic
step to facilitate high rates of economic growth is to attract immi-
grants with the skills and talents most essential to maintaining high
personal income and a favorable quality of life. Unfortunately, the
United States now faces a labor shortage in non-technical occupa-
tions as well. These shortages are likely to become more acute as
the number of young native Americans entering the labor force con-
tinues to fall. 94 Labor participation rates for men are expected to
decline below current levels in the coming decades, and the antici-
pated rise in the proportion of women working will not yield the
number of native workers necessary to meet projected demand.
The magnitude of the labor problem can be observed by examin-
ing projected labor demand. Between 1986 and the year 2000, the
nation will require almost 800,000 additional scientists and engi-
neers. 95 Insufficient numbers of Americans are currently enrolled in
scientific and engineering fields to meet expected demand. The sit-
uation is particularly critical at the graduate level. Only about 43%
93. See Simon, Getting the Immigrants We Need, Washington Post, Aug. 3, 1988, at
A18, for views of an economist who favors increased immigration. For an opposing view
on labor needs, see V. Briggs, Jr., supra note 46, at 259. Both, however, support the
position that occupational status should be a major criterion in determining the admis-
sion of aliens.
94. The civilian male labor force 16-24 years old is expected to decline from 13.6
million in 1980 to 10.5 million in 1995. The number of women working in this age
group is expected to decline from 11.7 million in 1980 to 9.6 million in 1995. See Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment Projections for 1995-Data
and Methods 17 table 31 (1986).
95. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Projections 2000, at 49 table 3




of all new engineers receiving doctoral degrees are native-born. 96
Enrollment in nursing schools is falling, although 612,000 addi-
tional registered nurses will be needed in the next 14 years to main-
tain an adequate health care system.
97
Shortages also loom at the lower end of the occupational spec-
trum. The total number of new food preparation and service per-
sonnel projected to be required by the year 2000 is a staggering 4.2
million. 98 The vast majority of these jobs requires only limited skills
or English-speaking ability. There are probably insufficient native
Americans to fill these jobs.
To meet this challenge, the nation has several immigration policy
options. Politically the least controversial path is to maintain the
status quo. Without new legislation, legal immigrants will continue
to fill some of the vacancies in engineering, nursing, and other pro-
fessions. However, given current legal entry limits, the number will
not be sufficient to satisfy the needs of American industries and in-
stitutions. Currently, thousands of the most needed workers are
only allowed to remain in the United States for limited periods, dis-
couraging permanent settlement that would increase the labor pool
of workers in greatest demand. The inflow will remain inadequate
because relatively few persons can be admitted permanently on the
basis of their skills. In the absence of stricter enforcement, illegal
immigrants can be expected to continue meeting most, but not all,
of the demand for unskilled or semi-skilled workers.
This nation needs new legislation to allow additional skilled per-
sons from all parts of the globe to enter the United States; the Ken-
nedy-Simpson Bill that passed the Senate in 1988 (Kennedy-
Simpson Bill) provides the format if not the precise content for such
a change.99 The Bill, which the House of Representatives will con-
sider in 1989, would not increase the total level of immigration in
the long run, but would gear the selection process to needed skills.
The proposed legislation would give preference to certain groups of
immigrants by expanding to nearly 120,000 the number of in-
dependent persons, those without close relatives in the United
States, who are allowed to enter.
96. Penner, Tapping the Wave of Talented Immigrants, Issues in Sci. & Tech.,
Spring 1988, at 76-80.
97. Projections 2000, supra note 95, at 49. However, only 30% of nurses admitted to
the United States, or with adjusted status, in 1987 were beneficiaries of occupational
preference. See 1987 INS Yearbook, supra note 48, at 39 table 19.
98. Projections 2000, supra note 95, at 51.
99. Immigration Act of 1988, S. 2104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 Cong. Rec. S2215
(1988).
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The 1965 Immigration Act allows 27,000 professional workers
and 27,000 skilled or unskilled workers in occupations suffering
from shortages to enter the United States annually. These quotas
include family members. The total number of workers actually ad-
mitted based on their occupation last year was only 22,500; the Ken-
nedy-Simpson Bill maintains this provision. 00 In addition, 55,000
independent visas would be authorized to workers and their families
in accordance with several criteria.' 0 ' Each criterion, including edu-
cation, occupation, English proficiency, and age, receives a point
value. The quality of the immigrant labor force would increase with
application of these criteria because most applicants would have a
college education or possess skills that are in short supply to be ad-
mitted under these criteria. The number of English-speaking immi-
grants would also increase, but the increase would not be
substantial since most potential entrants can amass sufficient points
without English language proficiency. Because potential immi-
grants who will meet the criteria are expected to greatly exceed the
annual limit of 55,000 persons, a lottery from a pool of qualified
workers will deternine who receives a visa.' 0 2
To attract more foreign capital, a provision was included in the
Kennedy-Simpson Bill to give preference for admission to 4,800 in-
dependent immigrants who agree to invest $2 million in the Ameri-
can economy. The Senate believes that each such investment will
create 10 or more jobs for American workers. 10 3 Following this ra-
tionale, 4,800 individuals would add $10 billion or more in overseas
funds to the economy annually, creating 50,000jobs. Such job crea-
tion assumes no constraints on the American labor supply and that
the investment is "new." In fact, some of the investment tied to the
issuance of visas would take place even in the absence of this provi-
sion. Many Asian entrepreneurs have already invested in the United
States and maintain residences in two nations. Therefore, congres-
sional expectations appear unrealistic on this point. Nonetheless, on
the basis of the experience of Australia and Canada, considerable
100. There is one modification. Under current law, the sixth immigration prefer-
ence allows entry of both skilled and unskilled workers. The Immigration Act of 1988
would allow skilled workers only. See Immigration Act of 1988, Report Together With
Additional Views, S. Rep. No. 290, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1988) [hereinafter Immi-
gration Act Report].
101. Id. at 38-40.
102. The 1965 Immigration Act differs in that it provides that when a quota is over-
subscribed applicants are placed in a queue and become eligible in future years.




additional investment might be forthcoming from individuals leav-
ing Hong Kong and countries threatened with internal upheaval.
10 4
From an economic perspective, the Kennedy-Simpson Bill would
not have a dramatic impact if it were enacted. However, the con-
gressional recognition that a key aspect of immigration policy is at-
tracting independent immigrants with needed skills is encouraging.
Congress, which would be required to review the bill every three
years, is likely to increase the number of independent immigrants if
labor shortages persist.
In its current form, the Kennedy-Simpson Bill has several draw-
backs. As part of a political compromise to ensure its passage, the
measure places an annual worldwide numerical limit of 590,000 per-
sons on all immigration, including immediate family reunifications,
for the first three years.' 0 5 Only refugees whose admissions are de-
termined by the 1980 Refugee Act are exempt from the ceiling of
590,000 persons per year.
10 6
Assuming annual refugee admissions consistent with recent expe-
rience, aggregate annual immigration would total about 700,000
persons were the Kennedy-Simpson Bill to become law. In compar-
ison, legal entrants, including refugee admissions, slightly exceeded
600,000 persons in 1986 and 1987. Because no limits currently ex-
ist on immediate family visas, legal immigration has been growing,
with total admissions expected to rise further during the 1990s.
Under the Kennedy-Simpson Bill, immigration in the second half of
the 1990s would likely be lower than projected under the 1965 Im-
migration Act. Thus, an effect of the measure would be to reduce
total immigration at a time when labor needs will be on the rise.
The second limitation is that the number of independent immi-
grants who would be allowed to enter is doubled from a very low
base. The total number of persons in this category would form only
16% of the total annual inflow, including refugees. Finally, the Ken-
nedy-Simpson Bill would eliminate from the sixth preference un-
skilled or semi-skilled workers in short supply. As noted earlier, the
demand for semi-skilled workers will continue, particularly in per-
sonal services. Although from an economic growth perspective
104. Australia attracted 3,535 business migrants (individuals who invested
$500,000) in 1986-1987, and Canadians have also attracted business migrants from
Asia, who had to invest $250,000 to be eligible for admission. See Chanda, Immigrant
Lottery, Far Eastern Econ. Rev., Mar. 31, 1988, at 36. The United States would require
considerably higher investment than other nations.
105. Immigration Act Report, supra note 100, at 12.
106. Id.
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these workers are less important than persons with specialized skills
requiring substantial education, a limited number should be eligible
for admission if shortages in their occupations are evident to the
Department of Labor.
An approach preferable to both current legislation and the Ken-
nedy-Simpson Bill would be to increase to 75,000 the number of
professional immigrants admitted who have skills and talents deter-
mined to be in short supply. Currently, only about 11,000 persons
(excluding dependents) are admitted on the basis of their profes-
sions. The number of nonprofessionals, both skilled and unskilled,
who are admitted because American enterprises are unable to find
domestic workers would rise from the current 11,500 to 25,000.
The number of visas granted on the basis of occupational prefer-
ence for both groups (including their families) would expand from
the current 54,000 to 232,000. During periods of economic decline
or when a sharp rise in graduates from the native population would
satisfy the needs of the public and private sectors, the number ad-
mitted under the occupation preference criteria would fall. Con-
versely, economic expansion could be expected to trigger a demand
for more immigrants, and Congress would authorize a higher quota.
English language competence could be one of the criteria applied
to select a proportion of applicants, and no more than 15% of immi-
grants should come from one nation in order to assure geographic
balance. Finally, new immigration legislation should limit the
number of fifth preference immigrants to 35,000 from the 64,800
ceiling of the 1965 Immigration Act. 10 7 No "cap" would be placed
on immigrants exempt from numerical limitation.
Had the above criteria been applied in 1986, total immigration in
1986 would have risen from the actual 602,000 to 744,000. But,
more importantly, the proportion of all immigrants (and their fami-
lies) who would have gained admittance as a result of their occupa-
tional status would have risen from 8.9% to 31.2%.
Giving preference to professional workers will attract engineers,
scientists, and other professionals in short supply, and concurrently
increase job opportunities at reasonable pay for Americans with lim-
ited skills. These immigrants not only fill jobs but, importantly, also
create employment by their presence. Each additional professional
107. Brothers and sisters of United States citizens can be admitted under the 1965
Immigration Act as fifth preference immigrants. The Kennedy-Simpson Bill would also
reduce the allowable number of fifth preference immigrants, and would restrict the fifth




job creates employment in services and retail trades. For this rea-
son, it is more difficult to overcome labor shortages that include all
sectors of the economy by increasing immigration than to alleviate
shortages in a limited number of occupations crucial to the nation's
welfare. The least desirable jobs created by legal immigration prob-
ably would be filled by undocumented workers. Because the major-
ity of these workers are single, they create little demand for public
services and housing.
If more immigration represents economic gain to the nation,
should Congress seriously consider returning to the pre-1921 poli-
cies of essentially unlimited entry? Viewed from a narrow, short-
term economic perspective, such an entry policy has merit. Rarely,
however, does-or should-a single objective dominate public pol-
icy. Even the more modest proposal espoused here, giving prefer-
ence to a substantial number of highly skilled immigrants, has
potential drawbacks. The nation may become too dependent on
foreign-born professionals, discouraging Americans from entering
these occupations. A particular ethnic group could, over time, dom-
inate one or more professions or businesses, relegating native
Americans to less-desirable jobs. These are plausible, but improba-
ble, adverse outcomes of increasing immigration.
Issues of culture, national identity, and language are more serious
problems that must be considered within the framework of immigra-
tion policy. To some commentators, even current entry levels ap-
pear excessive because they may worsen crime and cause other
problems.10 8 Others distinguish between those who come legally
and illegally. Thus, Professor Schuck is uneasy that "communitar-
ian" immigration law may encourage further social and cultural
fragmentation, fomenting political hostility among ethnic groups.l0 9
His concern is focused on illegal immigrants and their American-
born offspring who are granted citizenship despite the status of their
parents. As noted earlier in this Article, a large number of these
children, at least in the Los Angeles area, require and receive public
support. As for legal entrants, Schuck states that even a million or
more such immigrants annually "should be cause for eager celebra-
tion, not for alarm.""l 0
In reality, there are few economic or social differences between
legal and illegal entrants from Mexico, the Caribbean, and perhaps
108. R. Lamm & G. Imhoff, The Immigration Time Bomb (1985).
109. P. Schuck, Immigration Law and the Problem of Community, in Clamor at the
Gates 285 (I. Glazer ed. 1985).
110. Id. at 302; P. Schuck & R. M. Smith, Citizenship Without Consent 121 (1985).
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other nations as well."'I For those who view the common public
language of English as essential to national cohesion, absolute bor-
der control, eliminating the flow of illegal entrants, is no solu-
tion. 112 Most entrants, legal as well as illegal, differ in language and
culture from the American mainstream.
The 1965 Immigration Act has contributed to cultural pluralism,
as evidenced on the streets of virtually every large city in all regions
of this nation. Hindus, Moslems, and Buddhists have joined a soci-
ety in which the Judeo-Christian religious and ethical tradition was
dominant. Will this diversity encourage social fragmentation and
inter-group hostility? Another decade may have to pass before we
can respond to this question, but the turmoil and conflict of other
multi-ethnic nations supports this thesis.
Our own history suggests, but by no means assures, a more opti-
mistic outcome-the ability to blend various cultures within the
political framework evolved over two centuries. One has to ac-
knowledge that the vast majority of those who came to this country
prior to the late 1960s were invited-that is, they came legally. To
what extent resentment and hostility toward those who defy our
laws overshadows recognition of their economic contribution re-
mains to be seen.
The presence of legitimate social and cultural concerns, perceived
or real, shows that unrestricted entry would be politically unthink-
able. In contrast to such an unrealistic approach, the modifications
to current legislation proposed in this Article focus on economic
needs, with only a few potentially adverse effects. 1 3 Acceptance of
this approach would initiate the third era in the nation's long strug-
gle to formulate equitable entry policies that are in its self-interest, a
time when immigration laws are integrated with enlightened na-
tional economic policies.
11. Papademetriou & Muller, supra note 64, at 30.
112. For a discussion of language issues, see generally N. Glazer, Bilingualism: Will
it Work? Ethnic Dilemmas-1964-1982 (1983).
113. Environmental concerns associated with higher population and resulting
growth have been increasing in recent years. In the future, environmental issues may
come to the forefront of the immigration debate.
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